Deputinization and demoronification must start now, without waiting for the war to end
How much of the blame do the Russian nation (in Russia) and people of Russian nationality (elsewhere in the world, including Latvia) bear for what is happening in Ukraine? While this question may seem secondary, since the most important thing now is to prevent a world war, it is crucial to answer it in order not to take the wrong steps based on misinformation.
The importance of relying on correct information is illustrated by what is currently happening in Ukraine, where almost all experts agree that the Russian invasion of Ukraine was based on fundamentally flawed information about the mood in Ukraine. In fact, on blatant disinformation, according to which the Kyiv government, after the first military strikes, will flee to its "masters" behind the ramparts and the people, freed from the "junta", will hail the Russian army as their liberators.
Since this is not happening, a fairy tale has now been invented about "nationalists" who stand behind the army with pistols in their hands like Chekists and prevent ordinary soldiers from calmly laying down their arms and surrendering. And the towns are shelled by Ukrainians themselves so that they can accuse us, the liberators, of war crimes. You would think, well, who would ever believe in such obvious nonsense, but it turns out that people do. People do not want to hear the truth if it is not to their liking. As I keep saying, the truth is the version of reality that satisfies you.
At the moment, there are two different conceptions in the public sphere of how Russians should be treated in their country and in other countries, including here, where they make up a relatively large proportion of the population. One is the official one, which is broadcast both by our top officials and by the EU leadership. Here is Kariņš: "Dear people of Latvia! At this moment, it is important to show in words and deeds that we are a democratic country! Putin's crimes against the Ukrainian people are not the work of Russian-speakers or peaceful Russian citizens."
That is to say, a distinction must be made between the Putin regime and the "peaceful" Russian people, who are not to blame for the fact that a ruthless maniac has been ruling them. This doctrine has been dominant since 2014. Its main point is to justify the non-imposition of severe (i.e. mutually painful) sanctions. The idea is to impose sanctions that do not affect "ordinary people" but are painful only for those close to the Kremlin. So, no sanctions. Only purely symbolic ones, which would help to assuage one's own conscience and banish from one's head the nasty idea that money does not stink and, anyway, we really shouldn't meddle, let them deal with their own problems.
The other is much harsher: since many or most Russians like what Putin is doing, they are, just like the Germans eighty years ago, complicit in the crimes of their "national leader". The well-known PR specialist Jurģis Liepnieks tweeted: "I was in the gym. We traditionally have a lot of Russians there. For many years we haven't said a word about politics. Today we talked. I am in complete shock. Normal Latvian Russians, young people - eight out of ten support Putin and Russia and don't you even show us your fake news." What is more shocking in this tweet is that Liepnieks has only now discovered the information bubble in which a large part of his former and, given the upcoming elections (if they happen), potential clients live.
The results of a survey conducted by Factum have just been published, showing that the situation is not so bad after all. It should be noted that the survey was launched before the invasion of Ukraine, but even then the results correlate poorly with what Liepnieks, and not only Liepnieks, has said and seen. According to this poll, only 8.7% of the Latvian population fully or partially supports Russia's actions in Ukraine. Among those who speak Latvian in the family, only 2.7% do so, and among Russian speakers - 16.9%. If we add to these figures those who find it "hard to say" (meaning, to admit that they support Putin), then 7.4% and 48.4% respectively, which might be a more believable percentage.
As far as Russia is concerned, sociology has been strangled there for many years, so it cannot be trusted too much. But there is no reason to believe that the news circulating in the public sphere that 60-70% of Russians support Putin and his actions in Ukraine are untrue. The fact that many people in Russia believe that Ukraine attacked Russia first and other such nonsense should not be surprising, because Russia has built up a comprehensive propaganda machine, the malicious influence of which cannot be avoided even if one does not listen to it and is critical of the Putin regime. It is another thing if it is believed by Russians outside Russia, for example in Latvia, where all sorts of information is available ("don't you even show me your fake news").
A separate point must be made about those useful idiots who, even in times of war, do not stop looking for signs of nationalism to be combated in Latvian (not Russian) society. There are calls from various Kažokas (I don't know if Aija and Iveta Kažoka are related, but they sing a very similar song) for the Prime Minister and the President to get involved in "uniting" society, by which is also meant further tolerance of both the symbols of Russian imperialism and the advocates of this ideology.
The obvious question is what to do with these imperialists? What should be the attitude of the state and society towards them? Kariņš, the two Kažokas and other leftists call for tolerance towards these propaganda-covered "poor folks". In this narrative, these people must necessarily be displayed as poor victims, otherwise they do not fit into the Marxist formula of "oppressed" and "oppressors". Although the very idea that imperial thinking can be linked to the status of "poor oppressed" creates cognitive dissonance, the adepts of this concept manage to overlook it. They are the "poor folks" who must be defended according to ideological templates of good and evil.
These ideological template arguments should be strictly distinguished from other, supposedly rational but no less unreasonable arguments. Given that Putin has embarked on an move on such a scale that the spread of hostilities around the world cannot be ruled out, and that Latvia (the Baltics) is his likely next target, let us not give Putin an additional reason to attack. Why is this supposedly valid argument only supposedly valid and rational? There are two fundamental reasons for this. It is even difficult to say which is more important.
Firstly, as we see in the case of Ukraine and not only Ukraine, Putin does not need a real reason to attack someone or to try to cause lasting harm. A reason can always be invented if the will is there. If the strategic situation turns out in such a way that Putin decides to invade the Baltics, then what we do or do not do before the attack will be irrelevant. I have long expressed the view that attacking the Baltic States could be the main way for Putin to achieve his main strategic objective: to humiliate the West, to put NATO in its place.
It should be pointed out that the invasion of Ukraine had no meaningful reason at all, which could be repeated daily by Putin's useful idiots in the West. A few years ago there was a Russian-organized and financed campaign, in which our own propagandists from Re:Baltica irresponsibly got involved, which tried to identify Ukrainian patriots from the Azov volunteer battalion (deployed in the most difficult front line protecting the hard-to-defend Mariupol) with the Nazis, but now it is not central.
Secondly, but perhaps above all, the perpetual appeasement; the willingness to be tolerant of views hostile to Latvia; the calls not to tug the bear by the whiskers and similar proofs of "democracy", are extremely degrading to the nation's resistance. If a person has done everything to avoid a fight, has continually made concessions and indulged the aggressor, then he is only tempting the aggressor to act. Interestingly, in the case of domestic violence, Kažoka, Kariņš and their ilk do not call on the victim not to annoy the aggressor, to behave calmly, to make concessions, not to provoke, etc.
The question of who is the aggressor, oppressed and oppressor in the Latvian situation is illustrated by a tweet in response to Kariņš's call to be "democratic": "It's quite hard sometimes, when colleagues at work suddenly start speaking only Russian, come to work in a T-shirt with 'Russia' on it. Say that nothing has really happened in Ukraine and behave like 'liberators and victors'. We got along fine before."
If the "liberators" are already behaving like this now, when the Russian press, which openly supports Putin, is freely traded; when Alfa has a shop with Russian imperial symbols; when the content of the Latvian media in Russian is radically different from the Latvian versions, then what will happen when the hour of crisis comes? Unfortunately, the timid fear of not offending the aggressor does not help. Any psychologist will tell you that. Deputinisation and demoronification must start now, without waiting for the war to end. We must be strict and unyielding.