Crucial decisions in international politics are looming: at the end of June, the Ukrainians will find out whether they will be invited to join the European Union. The Baltic States will find out how heavy will be military reinforcements on their eastern border. The Finns and Swedes will find out whether the Turks will unblock their accession to NATO.
Diplomats and politicians are now running around between all kinds of official and unofficial meetings, each trying to get closer to the most favorable decisions for their country, which are expected at the end of this month. First, the European Council will meet on June 23 and 24. The European Council is the institution of the European Union in which the Heads of State or Government of the Member States sit. In fact, it is the supreme decision-making body because, unlike the European Commission or Parliament, it has the money and the power to say no on behalf of its own country. And this possible “no” is currently a major concern for Ukraine, for which EU candidate status and an accelerated accession procedure would be crucial in the current war situation. Ukraine is on the agenda of the European Council. But Ukrainians have no reason to be optimistic.
Sources in the foreign policy circles say that the current situation is as follows: among the 27 Member States, 10 to 12 are semi-stable supporters of Ukraine's accession, including Latvia. 7 to 10 countries are opposed to any special treatment. The rest are wavering. The reasons are varied. For example, the Netherlands is a categorical no. One might wonder what objection it could have to being friendly with Ukraine. But in 2016, a consultative referendum on the Association Agreement with Ukraine was organized there. A bunch of Eurosceptics turned up and voted against it by a 60% majority, and the result of that non-binding vote is now also dragging down the Netherlands' policy towards Ukraine. Another consideration of the critical Member States is the admission procedure for the countries of the Western Balkans. It would not be right that Ukraine, which has applied for membership of the European Union virtually only because of the war, should be admitted without going through the whole long ceremony of legislative harmonization, democracy, pluralism, the fight against corruption and years of paperwork. Moreover, warfare is not in itself a contributory condition for accession. Since decisions in the European Council are taken unanimously or not at all, it does not appear from the current mix of views that a decision in favor of Ukraine can be expected in the European Council.
Similar reasoning and bargaining, but in a different national format, is also taking place over the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO. The obstacles are posed by Turkey, which in exchange for a concession is demanding the declaration of all Kurdish rebel organizations as terrorist and the extradition of 30 specific Kurds. However, a more plausible reason is that Turkey, although a full and a quite militant member of NATO, is subject to various restrictions on the acquisition of arms. According to the official version, it was excluded from the US F-35 fighter program for the purchase of Russian-made missiles. And Turkey has still not joined the US and EU sanctions against Russia. So there is a lot to bargain, and there is a very strong possibility that the deal on Finland and Sweden joining NATO will not be concluded at the NATO meeting in Madrid on June 29-30, but at a later date.
From Latvia's point of view, the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO is very useful, as it will strengthen the defense capabilities and security guarantees of the NATO collective and these two countries in every way. However, the accession of Finland and Sweden will in no way resolve the issue of the Suwalki corridor and the defense of the three Baltic States. A different decision is needed here - that of an expanded NATO contingent in our region - and this must also be enshrined in the new NATO Strategic Concept, which will redefine Russia from a strategic ally to a strategic enemy. There is currently a haggling among Member States on how large the expanded NATO presence should be, with what weapons, for how long and, above all, who will pay for it. Because nobody wants to pay. The hypothetical estimate for the deployment of brigade-level units in the Baltic States is at least half a billion euros a year. In addition, NATO forces are also being reinforced in Romania, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, so a decision is needed on the full cost in the long term. As a first step, Defense Ministers will seek agreement on the reinforced defense of NATO's eastern flank on June 15 and 16. Failing that, a decision will be taken at the major NATO meeting in Madrid. Or, as sometimes happens in big politics, no decision will be taken.