At the end of June, Georgia was swept by a wave of demonstrations unprecedented since the early 1990s. What were they protesting against? Against the EU's refusal to admit Georgia as a candidate country.
Although the Georgians themselves prefer their country to be called Sakartvelo, let us stick to the name officially adopted internationally for the time being - Georgia. The EU summit of June 23-24 officially granted Ukraine and Moldova EU candidate status, but Georgia, which used to be "bound" with these two countries, was not given this status, which caused widespread political uproar.
It should be clarified here that EU candidate status does not mean that a country is guaranteed to be admitted to the EU in the foreseeable future, but it does confer a number of advantages in cooperation with the EU. However, the greatest impact of this status is on domestic political processes, as the so-called accession negotiations begin, the purpose of which is to align the candidate country's legislation, public administration model and social security system with EU requirements.
For many years, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova went to the EU together as three post-Soviet countries and at one point it even counted as the closest to the EU. Now Georgia has been left behind. Why?
In recent years, progress towards EU enlargement has slowed down overall. Because 1) the EU itself has been undergoing a certain re-evaluation of its "values" since the Greek economic crash of 2009-2012 and the migrant crisis of 2015-2016. There is a growing, hard-to-grasp but palpable gap in the triangle between the "old" Western Europe, the "newcomers" from Eastern Europe and the Southern European/Balkan countries with their peculiar mentality.
The EU is becoming less and less homogeneous and mentally united. Business and the political class may still find common ground, but it is becoming increasingly clear that the EU's expansion without limits threatens to have unpredictable consequences if for some reason internal contradictions were to escalate rapidly. If we put these relatively geographical contradictions side by side with the still existing unanimity in decision-making (the consensus principle), concerns about the future of the EU become clear. This is all the more so as these internal EU contradictions are hoped to be exploited by forces unfriendly to the EU, above all Putin's Russia. Put simply, the EU is in danger of becoming too big and too different in everything.
2) All three of these post-Soviet countries have not shown any particular zeal in recent years to transform their countries to EU standards. This is largely because the prospects of being admitted to the EU in the near future became dimmer every year. Moreover, the so-called "EU antechamber" has long been crowded by other countries, each of which felt it had a head start.
It is enough to list the countries that have long been candidates (but no closer to the EU door) to realize that the whole EU enlargement is on the skids: Albania, Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, North Macedonia. Now Ukraine and Moldova have joined them. If we are to be frank, it is only because Ukraine has been the target of a brutal act of aggression, and to neglect Ukraine in such a situation would be the height of cynicism. Whatever the EU bureaucrats might think, the political leadership there cannot afford to show such cynicism. Meanwhile, the new President of Moldova, Maia Sandu, is demonstrating a marked pro-Western stance, in contrast to her predecessor and friend of the Kremlin, Igor Dodon, and such a stance must be supported by a certain degree of reciprocity.
Against this background of Ukraine (a victim of aggression) and Moldova (with a new, pro-European President and government), Georgia looked dull. One extremely important point needs to be understood here. The EU is NOT interested in enlargement at any cost now. On the contrary. The EU is ready to use every excuse to slow down enlargement. This idea does not appear in any document, and it will not be loudly admitted by any EU official of any rank, but it is a reality.
At the moment, the closest country to the EU is North Macedonia, which has been an EU candidate for 17 years and has made many concessions in that time. It has even changed its name to avoid confusion with the Greek province of Macedonia. However, its accession is now being blocked by Bulgaria, which is basically demanding that the Macedonians renounce their national identity. Bulgaria is demanding that the Macedonian language be recognized as a dialect of Bulgarian, and that the history of (North) Macedonia be brought into line with the history of Bulgaria as one common part of it. In other words, history books in Bulgaria and North Macedonia should have the same treatment of historical events. Bulgaria basically wants to deprive North Macedonia of its national uniqueness.
There is no doubt that such Bulgarian political “impudence” would not be possible if the EU had the “goodwill” to enlarge. Since the trend is in fact the other way round, towards limiting enlargement, Bulgaria dares to act like this.
Against the backdrop of North Macedonia, it is easier than easy to reject Georgia (if one is so inclined). The Georgian political class itself may think they are far removed from Soviet-era Georgia, heavily westernized and long worthy of being in the EU, but from the heights of Brussels, things look very different. Power in Tbilisi has been taken over and effectively monopolized by a regime nominally led by the political party Georgian Dream, but which is in fact completely subordinate to the billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili.
"Your overwhelming desire to join the EU has been noticed in Brussels," the President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, said, addressing the Georgian people: "What is needed now is to make some important reforms and to show political will by working with civil society and driving these reforms forward. Then the next steps will be possible."
By reforms in Georgia, the EU means strengthening the independence of the judiciary, which is seen as a stumbling horse in almost all of Eastern Europe, the demonopolization of the political system and, in the case of Georgia, the issue of "deoligarchization", which has been particularly emphasized.
The response of Georgia's ruling political class to the EU's demands was easily predictable and was articulated by Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Garibashvili: "Yes, we are ready for rapid reforms, but doing them quickly is hampered by... the opposition." However, when his remarks were later criticized by Georgian President Salome Zourabichvili, he softened his position and admitted that the ruling party also needs to change and listen to the EU's demands for reform. However, on the main EU demand, Garibashvili did not change his position: "How dare you invoke Ivanishvili's name[as an oligarch]? Mr Ivanishvili is the biggest benefactor this country has ever had." Although Garibashvili acknowledged Ivanishvili's influence on Georgian political processes, he insisted that "Mr Ivanishvili is not an oligarch".
The main factor driving Georgia towards the EU is the overwhelming popular support for this move. More than 80% of the Georgian population supports the country's accession to the EU, and this public desire cannot be ignored. Neither by the Georgian political class, nor its informal leader Bidzina Ivanishvili, nor EU bureaucrats. As French President Emmanuel Macron said after the huge demonstrations in Tbilisi: "Such popular enthusiasm for Euro-integration cannot fail to provide the necessary support for these reforms." In other words, the choice of Georgia's future is in the hands of the Georgian people themselves.
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