Tuesday morning's message from Belarus: “This morning, before work, 20-25 doctors from Republican Scientific and Research Center "Cardiology" joined the chain of solidarity on the side of the street. Soon enough, several minibuses drove up to the protesters, and seven doctors - heads of departments, high-class cardiac surgeons - were detained. Work in the X-ray endovascular surgery department has been blocked, which deals with emergency care for patients with myocardial infarction."
This news aptly describes what is happening in Belarus. Doctors around the world are the most respected people in society, but heart surgeons in particular. Only a power machine completely disconnected from the center of the brain can grab reputable doctors, shove them in the bus and take them to the station. Waging war with medics is certainly not a smart idea, but the fact that Belarusian dictator Alexander Lukashenko has long been unreasonable, is something that most observers note.
October for the Lukashenko regime began hopefully. Daily protests gradually diminished and only Sunday's demonstrations in Minsk showed impressive numbers. What was Lukashenko's mind when he arrived at the KGB detention center on October 10 to meet with some of the detained oppositionists is unknown. The conversation lasted more than four hours, but the actual result was permission for the arrested Sergei Tikhanovsky to talk on the phone with his wife Svetlana, who was Lukashenko's main competitor in the August 9 presidential election. During this telephone conversation, Sergei urged his wife to act sharper, more energetically. The so-called Tikhanovsky’s ultimatum soon followed, the deadline of which expired on October 26.
It is irrelevant to list the demands of the ultimatum because it was clear to everyone that Lukashenko would not accept any ultimatum. However, this was not the main purpose of this measure either. The main thing was to set the end date of the ultimatum - a deadline. On the one hand, it encouraged the deflating protest movement (the October 25 actions were the most massive ones in the last month), but on the other hand, it maintained the regime's high nervousness, forcing it to make mistakes, which it did.
The regime announced a large-scale demonstration of loyalists in Minsk, to which thousands of Lukashenko supporters were to be brought from all over Belarus. Requests had already been sent as to how many demonstrators from each company, from each administrative-territorial unit should be transported to the capital; budget funds, transport units had already been allocated; two stages had already been erected in Minsk, but at the last minute the whole event was canceled, which showed the true support of the regime among the people. Even with all the huge power resources the regime was unable to arrange a decent picture.
The completely unnecessary brutality of power at the end of the October 25 protest, when flash and stun grenades were used against demonstrators, rubber bullets were fired, participants were hunted through the courtyards and people's homes were invaded, can be seen only as a mistake that just inspired protesters to continue resistance events.
Many observers pointed to the risks of the Tikhanovsky’s ultimatum. If Lukashenko does not give up and the declared general strike fails, then everything is lost. Either now or never. However, this setting is fundamentally wrong. The Lukashenko regime would very much like that to be the case - if we endure it this time, then we will be able to easily operate as before. However, authoritarian power mechanism does not work like that. Once an apple has started to rot, you can’t make it fresh again.
The power of the autocrat is based on the unwritten assumption in society that he controls everything, and everything depends on him. Including the milk yield of each cow. For this reason, Lukashenko has been regularly going to collective farms, factories, institutions and other places for 26 years, making the people think that without him everything will stop and collapse. But this is only one dimension of autocratic power. The other is that he demonstrates to everyone that he can control and direct human actions. This was the case, for example, with the Soviet-era demonstrations of 1 May and 7 November. When the party orders, then the people go to the Komjaunatne embankment, when they order to go and elect the Supreme Soviet, then when they order to stay at home, then they sit at home.
Therefore, any action that is not coordinated with the government and does not take place under its control must be eradicated from the outset. This explains the aggressive treatment of any demonstrators, no matter how peaceful they behave. The main thing is that they act on their own, not according to the will of the autocrat. A society that acts as a subject is the greatest fear of the autocrat. That is why Putin supports Lukashenko and other autocrats around the world, because the people must not be allowed to decide for themselves. This is why Russia treats Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan so coldly, who came to power in a way that tormented Putin's imagination like a bad dream (as a result of popular pressure).
For the third month in a row, Lukashenko has been trying to quell the protests, but, unlike other times, this time he is not up to the task. He does not fully control the situation in the country, which is the main sign of autocrat weakness. This is seen not only by him, but by the whole bureaucratic vertical of power, which begins to doubt internally whether, just like Akela from the Jungle book, he has not missed his prey. Even if the general strike fails, it means nothing, because the regime is rocking without stopping. Even if it persists today, it does not mean that it will withstand the next push tomorrow. Failure to keep control of what he has managed to keep under control for a quarter of a century is clearly frustrating Lukashenko.
Judging by various indicators, the real support for the regime is very low. In addition, it is low in almost all population groups. The only real support for the regime is power structures that are disproportionately well paid, with excellent social guarantees, housing and, most importantly, very difficult termination conditions.
By signing a contract for work in the OMON service, a young person (mostly from regions, who do not want to study at university) gets enviable conditions, but is forced to sign a long-term contract, which in case of termination loses not only all benefits, but for some (free living space) has to pay back. As a result, OMON fighters owe everything to the regime and it is very difficult for them to move to the other side of the barricades, even if they wanted to.
Regularly following the events in Belarus, it must be admitted that in 26 years the regime has cemented not only the foundations of extremely strong power structures, but also a relatively passive and submissive society. I think that Western people who have never lived in a totalitarian society cannot really understand what is happening in Belarus. It is impossible to understand how society endures all the atrocities of its silovik OMON and has not yet expelled the hated regime. They simply cannot imagine a life in which there is virtually no laws, in which a silovik can do absolutely anything with an id card in his pocket, and he will get no punisment for it, but any other person can be imprisoned even without a formal offense. Even the imitation of the rule of law has been completely eliminated in the country, so it is not for nothing that the state’s uncontrolled media call it the kolkhoz junta.
What to expect next and what should we do? It must be understood that the regime in Belarus has begun to falter and will never be stable again. No one can say at the moment how long Lukashenko will last. He can fall at any time in many different ways. Starting with the inner (silovik) coup d'etat, and ending with some influential transfer of power to the people and an avalanche-like crumbling of the system. But just as well, the regime can painfully endure for a long time to come.
The Lukashenko regime looks very unsympathetic at the moment, and any relationship with it is toxic. This does not mean that any cooperation with Belarus and its people (not related to the regime) should be frozen. On the contrary, the most favorable starting conditions must be prepared for the moment when the regime falls. At the same time, a political decision must be made as soon as possible on what to do with the 2021 IIHF World Championship, which our country once undertook to co-host together Belarus. Uncertainty and hesitation on this issue only demonstrate the prevailing indecision of Kariņš’ government, not to mention the cowardice, which has been pointed out by the leadership of the International Hockey Federation as well.