"It is no coincidence that Russian leaders increasingly use prisoners' language: it is a gangster environment. If we look through this prism, there are no surprises. And I was not surprised for a moment that after the signing of the grain agreements there was a missile strike on the port of Odesa. But it will be a long process before European countries come to the sense that such Russian actions are not surprising," said Jānis Sārts, Director of the NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence. Here’s today's interview with him.
A Russian blogger recently called Latvians "Sharikovs" and "Neanderthals" who have no cultural values of their own. One could, of course, ignore the ranting of every propagandist, but there are still too many of them. Has it not been the case that their number has increased dramatically since February 24, when the invasion of Ukraine by fascist Russia began? As they say, the ranters found the courage...
I don't think that it was purposeful in Latvia.
When Russia started the big, terrible war, it raised the temperature of emotions. And it also stirred up the emotions of people who were previously "soft" Putinists, turning them into radical Putinists. Before, we tried not to see it; now it has all jumped out. Russia itself does not have the strength to concentrate on cultivating propaganda outside its own country, because the strength goes into producing it at home.
Moreover, it did not all start on February 24. The poisoning of the public has been going on for a long time. In wartime, the Russian propaganda message was more blatant, more aggressive. The circumstances in which these messages are put into practice have changed, and we as a society are reacting more sharply to them.
The advantage of so-called “soft power” is that it is powerful when it is soft, when you do not feel it and it does not seem to matter. Now it is no longer soft. Now we see that it goes in the context of something like the Kremlin propagandist Solovyov's shows.
What do you declare as "soft power"?
Every country, including Latvia, has one. Song festivals, folklore...
But we don't bother anyone with our song festivals and folklore!
"Soft power" is not evil in itself. It becomes evil the moment it is used for evil purposes. Many countries - including Latvia - perceive Russian soft power as mere culture, not understanding or not wanting to understand that behind it there are evil intentions, namely to gain influence. Influence that would destroy a particular country in order to make it its vassal.
We have recently seen that Russia's “soft power” is beginning to wane. At least in Europe. But that does not mean that those who are already entangled in the Russian “soft power” will be released from it. They are there to stay. They may even radicalize.
Listening a little to Solovyov's delusions, one involuntarily begins to think that he and propagandists like him, themselves psychopaths, are trying to turn the whole of Russia into lunatics.
This is a good time to reread George Orwell's 1984 and Animal Farm. Strong associations with the present day. But I have to say: propagandists are not crazy. They make a lot of money selling their souls. They are leading Russia into an alternative reality, and this trajectory is closer to that of North Korea, less to that of China. And this is extremely dangerous for the Russian people. I think that the propagandists are, for the most part, aware of what they are doing. Perhaps it is some kind of defensive reaction, trying to believe what they themselves are saying. But to repeat the big money point: how many villas in Italy did Solovyov have? And in Russia, too?
But how can all these Solovyov delusions be believed? And there are other ways of getting information.
The propagandists' messages are not new; they have been more or less intense for a long time. But the important thing is that the majority of the Russian population has self-identified with the propagandists' narratives: we are powerful and chosen, we have special rights, and so on. They see this not only in relation to the state, but also in relation to themselves. Because for most of them, there is nothing else in life. They have never even left their oblast, they live in deep poverty. But this self-identification is a way of feeling valuable in this life.
If they see other information, it does not make them change their minds. Because that would mean destroying self-identity. It would mean: you had a bad life, but in a chosen nation; if the feeling of being chosen is destroyed, then you will only have a bad life...
...without being chosen. Really pathetic. Well, that's the way it is in Russia. But here you can get real information, not Solovyov's delusions.
Long-poisoned minds also live here. But the Russians here do not live in a small Siberian town with all the consequences that entails. The main misfortune: we have allowed Russian TV channels to operate for too long. And it is not just the Solovyov show. We once had a study on the use of Russian humor in propaganda. There was a huge storm of indignation in Russia about our study.
Now we realize that we were too late in closing Russian TV channels?
Yes. In retrospect, we can say that it was not timely, both because of prevailing EU views and because of concerns about curbing freedom of expression. Unfortunately, we put these propaganda "media" on the same place where the really normal media were. We were wrong. But we must remember that next time. The West must also remember.
But the West is rather soft, it thinks that it is not affected.
Russia has now gone beyond the limits. We also have to understand that war fatigue has set in: there are other issues and other problems. But Russia has committed such crimes that it will not be able to get back to where it once was.
Do you really think so? People have such short memories... I am skeptical.
There are good reasons for thinking that. After 2014, Europe went “business as usual” quite quickly. But it is different now. There are very big events compressed into an extremely short period of time. Tectonic shifts are taking place that will usher in the new normal. There are processes going on that we do not know how they will end. And I am not talking about the war in Ukraine; this is Russia's war against the West. Yes, Russia is doing it, but some countries are watching where this war is going. But we have to understand that changes in the economy and energy policy are here to stay. It will not be the same as it was in 2014.
On the Russian side, it will probably be even crazier. As soon as the Russians open their mouths, it is clear that they are lying.
It is no coincidence that Russian leaders increasingly use prisoners' language: it is a gangster environment. If we look through this prism, there are no surprises. And I was not surprised for a moment that after the signing of the grain agreements there was a missile strike on the port of Odesa. But it will be a long process before European countries come to the sense that such Russian actions are not surprising.
Will Russia finally be recognized as a state that supports terrorism?
Hardly.
Why?
There will still be countries that believe that they should retain the possibility to talk to Russia. But what will change is the message that Russia is, after all, a terrorist state, with all the consequences that that entails. That message will be reinforced.
The US is talking about it.
Yes, in terms of the message, the narrative is changing. And we will feel it more and more. Will small countries talk about it? I think not. Rather, what is happening could be recognized as genocide. That would have legal consequences.
I am also skeptical that there is any possibility of an international court, punishing the perpetrators...
If Russia loses the war fundamentally, then it is possible.
Then Russia can just fight indefinitely.
Well, no. Russia's military might was inflated at the beginning of the war, “we will show them who’s boss”! Similarly, Russia's military capacity to continue the war for a long time is also exaggerated.
Huge amounts of money are pouring into Russia every day.
Yes, money is pouring in. But money does not translate directly into weapons. Weapons - figuratively - are worktables, human knowledge, materials. The Russians produce weapons, but with what? If we can secure sanctions in this area, they will prevent the production of these weapons, especially in the high-tech sector.
Artillery does not win battles. Logistics, supply and command management win the battle. A hundred artillery pieces will be of no use if the soldiers have nothing to shoot with and do not know where to shoot. There may be a lot of money, but combat capability will not be created on its own.
Let us be clear: an international trial for war crimes can only take place if Russia loses the war?
It can be tried "in absentia". But justice is unlikely to be achieved that way. If Russia loses and is prepared to admit what it has done.
Russia will never admit it.
It is difficult to predict. But what is clear at the moment is that Russia is an empire, and empires have no place in this century. A clear victory for Ukraine will also start Russia's internal processes.
How do you feel? Will Ukraine win?
I think so. I said in the second week of the war that it would win.
Of course, I also believe and trust that it will win. But to a certain extent, it is wishful thinking.
I have already said that from the very beginning I was one of those who did not believe in Russia's military might. Now I see that it is a serious, big possibility - a Ukrainian victory. Russia has fundamental problems in waging war. For a whole month, Russia, with the “might” of its military machine, tried to take Severodonetsk and Luhansk. It looks like they cannot even do that anymore. The Ukrainians have a chance there, but they are very dependent on Western support.
Why is Germany so weak on aid?
Economically Germany is doing a lot, but not militarily... A reproach against modern Europe: the inability of the ruling elites to think strategically. Germany is a case in point. The German elite has had a long and well-oiled relationship with Russia. Moreover, Germany fears that Russia will completely cut off energy exports to Germany. Putin sees this as an instrument of influence.
Putin's instrument of influence is also the threat to use nuclear weapons.
In theory, he would be prepared to do so if it did not lead to a full nuclear escalation. A man who sits at long tables is certainly not suicidal. So, he would decide to do it if it did not endanger himself.
If we are talking about tactical nuclear weapons: the chain from giving the task to carrying it out is a long one. There are several levels of people who have to do what is in the orders. This is also a factor in the decision: if people are told to do it and nothing further happens, this creates a different, new dynamic in the Russian power sphere.
Local threats are also important. It has been said that if the Pārdaugava monument is removed, we will not have an easy time...
It all depends on whether Russia has free resources to put to use at the time... I think that the cyber-attacks on Latvia, which are taking place now and on a huge scale, are also connected with promises to take down the monument. Cyber attacks have never been so intense and frequent. There are around a hundred targets a day.
What are your thoughts on the national defense service, which is a topical issue at the moment?
There are objective reasons why this conversation started in the first place. We need to have a bigger army. But at the moment we are going deeper and deeper into the demographic pit: there are fewer and fewer young people.
But there are big and important issues to discuss.
The first is: who will this service cover? The only European country where this service has remained universal is Finland. But even there, only 70% of young people are conscripted into the army. Elsewhere, the percentage is much lower.
Another thing. To what extent will the resources - and they will be large - eat into the development plans that the country has had? Because, as we see, a soldier without equipment and training is nothing. But our plans now include the purchase of HIMARS systems and much more. This will be additional expenditure. How to balance all this?
Thirdly. Who will train the new recruits? Those who are doing things professionally at the moment will be moved to training. This means that, for a time, we will have a drop in the level of military preparedness. Of course, in the end, the level will outgrow the actual military capability as it was at the beginning. But it will take years. How to get through this phase? This is something that needs to be seriously discussed.
Finally. How will we ensure that the military reserves can be brought together quickly if necessary? Young people scatter all over the world. What will happen in the event of a sudden attack? Then only the regular army will be able to help.
Clearly, we need to move in the direction of national defense service. We must ensure that the young people who come to serve in the army have good conditions and a high level of training. But it does not happen for free. But if we do it, we do it thoroughly.
For the time being, we have to rely on NATO.
I have only good news. A brigade will be deployed in Latvia - around 4000 people. NATO has a rapid reaction force of 300,000 troops. I cannot reveal the details - where, how and how quickly they are arriving. Moreover, with Finland and Sweden becoming NATO members, there is operational depth, we do not have to think that we will defend our country only as far as the Kurzeme coast, for example.