The Russian army will get stuck in Ukraine

The first week of Russia's war against Ukraine is drawing to a close. If Vladimir Putin had planned a blitzkrieg (a quick and easy victory), what Putin and the Russian military had in mind has failed. Although many Ukrainian towns have been taken over by the Russian army in several directions, the overall speed of movement of the Russian army even in southern Ukraine does not indicate success.

Why did Russia succeed in its "quick" war in 2008, when it invaded Georgia and separated Abkhazia and South Ossetia from it? Why did the Russian army succeed very quickly in seizing local power and annexing Crimea in 2014? And why is it unable to repeat this in Ukraine in 2022?

One explanation can be found by answering a similar question about Hitler's aggression in 1938-1941. Hitler managed to take Denmark, the Czech Republic and western Poland very quickly, but it took him longer to subdue France and Norway, while the USSR (Russia) could not be defeated at all. Why is that?

The answer lies not only in the circumstances, whether the invaders are resisted or not (the Danes and Czechs did not fight, the Poles did), but in the scale of the war zone. If the area is so small that a tank or armored vehicle only needs a tankful of petrol to subdue it, then such a small area can be conquered quickly by overwhelming odds.

In 2008, when fighting the Georgian army, the Russian armed forces only had to cover a few tens of kilometers. In 2014, Crimea was subjugated using troops stationed at the Russian army base in Sevastopol. The distance from Sevastopol to the north and east of Crimea is 150-220 km. A full tank of petrol was enough for military vehicles to reach any point in Crimea.

However, what can be done in a small area cannot be replicated on the scale of a country as large as Ukraine, especially if there is fierce resistance to the invaders.

With a country as large as Ukraine, military superiority is no longer absolutely decisive, as military logistics become the decisive factor in determining the speed of troop movements. The Soviet-era BMP 1 infantry fighting vehicle has 38 cannon shells in its combat kit. Once they are all fired, the gun will fall silent unless new charges are brought to the battlefield.

If there is retaliation, the ammunition will be used up very quickly, the fuel will run out very quickly with the engines constantly running (since you have to maneuver). When the tank runs out of fuel, it will stop and will not move again until the fuel is delivered to the battlefield, etc. As long as the troops are close to their bases, they can be supplied relatively quickly, but the further they go into enemy territory, the longer and more resource-intensive the troop supply lines become.

Ammunition supply is not the only issue that military logistics has to deal with. As hostilities drag on, combat equipment is damaged or broken and needs to be repaired (spare parts need to be delivered), destroyed combat equipment needs to be replaced by a new one, etc. Soldiers need not only ammunition and weapons, but also food, drinking water and periodic rest. Wounded soldiers need medical attention, the more seriously wounded need to be transported to hospitals, the killed need to be collected. Transport and communication lines must be established, maintained and protected against sabotage. All support vehicles must also be supplied with fuel. The transport, feeding and guarding of captured opponents, etc., must be carried out. In addition, when taking over a town that was devastated by the fighting, the minimum needs of the local population (health, food, water, heat, etc.) must be provided.

The fiercer the resistance, the longer the war and the deeper the Russian army goes into Ukraine, the more important the military logistics component becomes, the more people (drivers, medical staff, etc.) have to be involved in supplying and the more resources are needed.

Therefore, the success of the Russian army in 2008 and 2014 will not be repeated. The Ukrainian army and self-defense forces have a good chance of effectively resisting even in the face of significant military-technical superiority.