Putin theatrically arrives in the Kremlin at night

Late on Saturday evening, traffic was blocked in central Moscow to allow the presidential motorcade to enter the Kremlin at high speed. Immediately, rumors spread that a special, extraordinary announcement was being prepared.

What added particular drama to this theatrical night visit by Putin to the Kremlin (although there is no evidence that Putin was actually brought to the Kremlin in the presidential motorcade) was the uproar in the Russian media about the "blockade" of Kaliningrad (definitely to be put in quotations marks, as we are now talking only about restrictions on land transit for steel and steel products) and the relentless talk in the Western press about the poor military security of the Suwalki corridor. In the latter case, however, it must be admitted that the concerns are quite justified.

The extremely popular Telegram channels play a huge role in the Russian information space, without exaggeration. There, more than in many other parts of the world, they are replacing the traditional media. These Telegram channels immediately spread all sorts of versions, dominated by a somewhat imaginary anxiety about the possibility of war with Lithuania (read: with NATO).

However, several factors suggested that this move by Putin was probably a bluff aimed at putting pressure on the G-7 summit in Germany and the upcoming NATO summit in Madrid.

Firstly, the showy drive through the whole of Moscow. In today's circumstances, any event can be organized quietly and unnoticeably, as long as its main purpose is not specifically to draw attention to it. Secondly, it is the Telegram channels that are the segment of the Internet that Kremlin propagandists are actively trying to infiltrate. Anonymously, under various aliases and with generous salaries from the presidential administration. These mass warnings and overplayed fears are therefore only a testimony to the decorative nature of this exercise. Thirdly, but perhaps most importantly, various military commentators, from the Conflict Intelligence Team to the Institute for the Study of War, stress that in other circumstances there might be some more serious grounds for concern, but that at the moment Russia has no interest in opening a “second” front in the Baltics, because all its resources are concentrated on winning the Donbas. Not even in the whole of Ukraine, but in the eastern part.

While these factors may be seen as reassuring to the world, they do not in themselves guarantee the security of this world (not just our country). The argument that it is not in Putin's interests has already proved its ineffectiveness time and again. Only clear signals from the West that there will be no endless concessions to Putin and that we are ready to fight if necessary could be a convincing argument for the Kremlin to become careful with its statements and actions.

Is this happening? Not even close. As soon as a Western leader says a stronger word (US President Joe Biden about how Putin can’t be left in power, or US Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin about being prepared to move heaven and earth), the other side (NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg) chants the Putin-pleasing tune about NATO's main task being to not intervene, avoid escalation of the conflict and do everything to prevent a global nuclear war. In a separate playlist must be placed the incessant phone calls and proposals of French President Emmanuel Macron on how to save face for Putin.

Instead of the West, with its 30% of world GDP and an annual military budget of over a trillion dollars, firmly telling Russia, with its less than 2% of world GDP and a military budget of 154 billion dollars, that further rocking of world security will not be tolerated and that we (or even the US alone) will not hesitate under certain conditions (these conditions must be clearly defined) to deal a military blow to those who threaten the existing order, the West keeps repeating what it will not do; what they do not wish (are afraid) to tolerate, and repeat in various forms: we are prepared to do anything to avoid having to fight.

In this regard, we - the ones who understand the Russian language and Russian domestic culture - must remind the Western leaders in every possible way of what one of the most prominent Russian sociologists, Grigory Yudin, said about the Western political class in an interview with the magazine Rīgas Laiks: "I say [to them in 2018]: ‘There will be a war, bombs will fall right on top of you, it's about to start.’ They heard nothing at all. I try to be polite, more so when I am invited, but that time I dared a little demarche, I said: ‘You do realize that in Russia everybody thinks you are weaklings? From Putin to Navalny. They think that they can do whatever they like with you.’"

As much as I hate to admit it, the G-7 meeting, where one of the main items on the agenda was stopping Putin's aggression, did not dispel this unshakable belief of Putin and the rest of Russia that the West is just an alliance of “weaklings”. Boris Johnson's jokes about how we too might have to be photographed shirtless on horseback like Putin may have been funny to them and worthy of tabloid headlines, but I cannot say they particularly inspired the defenders of Ukraine or hurt the Kremlin. On the contrary.

What are the tangible results of this meeting? Just one figure: the USD 600 billion that the G-7 countries are promising to invest in infrastructure projects in developing countries. One could say that this is great, because the developed countries must ensure that the world develops more smoothly, but it turns out that the real reason for allocating this sum is to counteract China's influence. In order to prevent China from taking too large a place in the “third” world, the “first” world must not be left behind.

This, too, could be accepted, since competition is one of the driving forces of development, and there is nothing wrong with China and the G-7 countries competing with investments in the “third” world. But what about the world's greatest current threat - Putin's militarism? What are the G-7 prepared to put up against Putin? 600 billion against China, but how much against Putin? Not to mention aid to Ukraine. To what extent is the G-7 prepared to cushion the economic burden by limiting Russia's place in the world economy?

Oh, not a cent? Each country has to deal with this on its own? Well, it is not as if the West is doing nothing to stop Putin. Four of the G-7 countries are prepared to stop Russian gold imports, which will result in Russia incurring a loss of USD 15.4 billion. This would strike at the heart of Putin's war machine, Johnson argued.

Let’s remember the 600 billion that the G-7 are prepared to set against China, and put this gold embargo next to it. I have no doubt about Johnson's good intentions, nor about his willingness to help Ukraine in various ways, but to say that this gold embargo will be a fatal blow to the heart of Putin's war machine means only one thing: Grigory Yudin did not exaggerate a thing in his 2018 remarks and the Kremlin's Saturday night parade with the presidential motorcade has at least partially worked.