There is little hope that the lessons of the 20th century will be taken into account by anyone

For the third week in a row, the hysteria of war continues on the Russian propaganda resources. For a while, I avoided writing about this topic because at first, it seemed that all this rattling of weapons looked more like a "mental attack" than a real preparation for war. Recently, however, more and more serious analysts, who have always stood out with a balanced, rational analysis of the situation, point out that the dangers of war are very real and that the world community must do everything possible to prevent them.

I am thinking in particular of Professor Vladimir Pastukhov of the University College of London, who has published a major article in Novaya Gazeta warning of the high likelihood of large-scale conflict and an analysis of the Conflict Intelligence Team, which states that the current concentration of military forces at the Ukrainian border is unprecedented. A similar opinion was expressed in the White House statement.

The size of the Russian armed forces in the region is significantly higher than at the peak in January/February 2015 during the Debaltseve operation, and trains from Siberia are still only approaching the potential war zone. It is also a matter of concern that the current front of the conflict is too narrow for such a large force, which suggests significant plans to expand the front.

It should be noted that other analysts tend to think that there will be no widespread Russia-Ukraine armed conflict because the possible price and risks are too high. Pastukhov, who has not stood out with emotional impulsiveness before, points out that people in pre-war situations always create psychological barriers that block the possibility of war as such. There will be no war because it simply cannot be. Unfortunately, any model of Russian development, according to Pastukhov, "leads to war as an inevitable outcome of the regime's evolution."

What is the basis for such a pessimistic view? First of all, it should be clarified that Pastukhov admits that at the moment no one can say whether there will be a war or not, because the final decision will be made situationally, based on the specific circumstances. At the moment, if it can be said that the pieces (army units) are being placed on the table so that they can be used if necessary. It is possible that this time it will all end without much bloodshed, but this does not mean that a different "outcome of the regime's evolution" is possible.

The main engine of the war, according to most analysts, is Russia's domestic political situation. "Once Russia has chosen militarization as a method of solving domestic and foreign problems, there is no way Russia can get off this needle," Pastukhov writes. "By giving impetus to the army and the military-industrial complex, making 'defense' the main driver of economic development, he (Putin) has trapped himself, as he is now forced not only to feed the monster regularly, but also to take it for a walk from time to time."

The popular discussions about what makes war good or bad, in my opinion, have lost their meaning. The processes have begun their autonomous direction. The very beginning of World War I is a clear example that shows that the main cause of war is setting a state (then Prussia) on the tracks of militarism, from which it cannot be removed. At the moment, the main threat to peace is the general militarization of Russia, because sooner or later you have to reach your destination. The only question is whether the army field camps currently being built in the Voronezh steppes are already fast approaching this destination or just an intermediate station on the way to it.

However, the main root of the conflict, which undoubtedly nourishes the Kremlin's imperial ambitions, is the special relationship between Russia and Ukraine. Most Western politicians (not to mention Ukrainian society) see these two countries as two separate, sovereign states. The problem is that not only Putin, but also part of Russian society does not accept this separation of Ukraine in any way and perceives Ukraine as an artificial "formation". The unification of the nation (not nations) is the doctrinal, largely irrational goal that permeates all anti-Ukrainian rhetoric, because there is no such Ukrainian nation, by that logic. There are only "khokhols" as the "stray" branch of the Russian people.

Russia, without Ukraine (Kiev), is having difficulty defining its new, post-Soviet national identity, and is therefore suffering. At the subconscious level, Russian society is aware that to end this "suffering", the "Ukraine issue" must be resolved, so it is quite accepting of the demonstratively vile mocking of Ukrainians on television. Consequently, the potential support for military action against the Ukrainian "fascists" is relatively high and, if the situation develops favorably, can help Putin and his elite to regain the faded love of the people.

The key word here is "if the situation develops favorably." What does it mean? That is: if the Ukrainian side would give a good enough reason (casus belli) to start active hostilities; if the Ukrainian army showed weak psychological readiness for full resistance, but the Western reaction to the activities of the Russian army would or could be interpreted as conciliatory.

Another question: what would be the ultimate goal of this military operation? Russian society is suffering from the loss in the Cold War and is craving revenge (albeit subconsciously). It suffers from what is called "Versailles syndrome" in the West. In 2014, "a" was said in Crimea, and now many are waiting for "b" to finally be said. The problem is that Russia does not feel that Crimea, Kharkiv, Mariupol or the so-called corridor to Crimea is enough. These benefits will not remove imperial phantom pain. Russia needs the whole of Ukraine, or at least the left bank of Ukraine. Although this goal is associated with huge problems after the end of the war as well, it would not be so unrealistic if Russia were ready to completely abandon the generally accepted norms and decide to do as it pleases, ignoring possible sanctions.

The popular arguments that the war is not good for the Russian elite because it is closely linked to the West (their children study there; they buy real estate there and they receive medical services there) lose their relevance in this situation.

First, the decision will be made, if not by Putin alone, then in a very narrow circle, where no one will care about the interests of some Shuvalov or another. Secondly, when the mind is obscured by the fog of the military and the adrenaline of a fight is boiling in the blood, there is no time to think about such "little things."

Russian President-autocrat Vladimir Putin is clearly not interested in domestic affairs, the country's economic and technological development. All these things, which in theory should be dealt with by the head of state, openly bore him. Geopolitics and various models of the latest weapons are a whole another story. In addition, Russia's top elite has reached a consensus on the permissibility of war as a solution to political issues, which opens up unimaginably wide prospects for the flight of geopolitical fantasies.

The big problem with the anti-war movement is that in the West, Putin is commonly referred to as an autocrat or dictator, but much less attention is paid to his undisguised militarism. It tries not to see his love for war toys. Moreover, unlike Russia, the likelihood of war in the West is ignored and anything that could lead to it is selectively not seen.

In two similar situations in the last century, war could not be averted, and serious conclusions should be drawn from the mistakes made at the time. It must be understood that the biggest mistake is to think that war can be prevented by speaking and with reassuring stories that war "is not good for anyone." Whether Putin chooses a military solution to problems largely depends on the position of the West. How strong and unified it will be. So far, there is no indication that this position would be significantly different from the position taken by the West during Hitler's Anschluss of Austria and the occupation of Czechoslovakia. Judging by the broadcasts of Russian propagandists, the Russian elite also has an unshakable conviction that the West has lost the last remnants of its manhood; that they are cowardly and will wipe the spit from their face, after which they will foolishly smile in a la Kariņš style.

The call made by US President Joe Biden these days to reduce the US military budget can be seen in the Kremlin as a signal not to worry too much about the Western reaction. Instead of expressing "deep concern", "very deep concern" could be expressed. Would that be the so-called "high price" that Putin will have to pay? You can judge for yourself whether Putin is willing to pay this "price."

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